Redefining Race in Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji and Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb: Using Dictionaries Instead of the Thirteenth Amendment by Redmond, Jennifer G.
Vanderbilt Law Review 
Volume 42 
Issue 1 Issue 1 - January 1989 Article 6 
1-1989 
Redefining Race in Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji and Shaare 
Tefila Congregation v. Cobb: Using Dictionaries Instead of the 
Thirteenth Amendment 
Jennifer G. Redmond 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr 
 Part of the Law and Race Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Jennifer G. Redmond, Redefining Race in Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji and Shaare Tefila 
Congregation v. Cobb: Using Dictionaries Instead of the Thirteenth Amendment, 42 Vanderbilt Law Review 
209 (1989) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol42/iss1/6 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Vanderbilt Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information, 
please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu. 
Redefining Race in Saint Francis
College v. Al-Khazraji and Shaare
Tefila Congregation v. Cobb: Using
Dictionaries Instead of the
Thirteenth Amendment
I. INTRODUCTION ........................................... 210
II. THE 1987 CASES ......................................... 212
A. The Supreme Court's Analysis .................... 212
1. Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji .......... 212
2. Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb ........... 214
B. The Analytical Facade ........................... 214
C. Precedent ....................................... 215
1. The Cited Precedent ........................ 215
2. The Precedent Not Cited .................... 216
III. CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY SUPPORT FOR SECTIONS
1981 AND 1982 ....................................... 218
A. The Thirteenth Amendment ...................... 218
B. The Civil Rights Act of 1866 ..................... 219
C. The Adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment ...... 221
D. The Voting Rights Act of 1870 .................... 222
E. Consolidation and Codification ................... 223
IV. THE SUPREME COURT'S EVALUATION OF THE PRECEDING LEG-
ISLATIVE AND STATUTORY HISTORY ........................ 224
A. The M ajority .................................... 224
B. The D issents .................................... 225
V. POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES OF ADDRESSING SQUARELY
WHETHER TO EXPAND THE SCOPE OF THE THIRTEENTH
AMENDMENT .......................................... 228
VI. CONCLUSION ............................................. 230
209
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:209
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1987 the Supreme Court unanimously extended the protections
of 42 U.S.C. sections 19811 and 19822 to ethnic groups,3 citing Runyon
v. McCrary.4 Runyon reinterpreted the legislative history of section
1981 to create a cause of action for blacks against both public and pri-
vate discrimination in the making and enforcement of contracts.5 One
year later a sharply divided Supreme Court ordered the parties in Pat-
terson v. McLean Credit Union,6 a case in which the Court already had
heard argument, to brief the Court anew and make arguments on an
issue that none of the parties had raised-whether to overrule Runyon
v. McCrary.'
The Supreme Court's request reminded the legal community that
the constitutional authority for Runyon is and always has been in dis-
pute.8 Yet Justice White, who with Justice Rehnquist wrote the vehe-
ment and widely cited dissent to Runyon, authored the unanimous
opinions for the Court in Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji and
Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb,1° which permit ethnic groups to
employ sections 1981 and 1982 in order to reach private acts of discrim-
ination. The justices of the Supreme Court accomplished this expansion
of Runyon without examining precedent or establishing a constitutional
foundation. Rather, the Court defined the term "race" to include ethnic
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982). Section 1981 reads:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every
State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to
the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property
as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties,
taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.
Id.
2. Id. § 1982. Section 1982 reads:
All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every State and Territory, as is
enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and
personal property.
Id.
3. Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, 107 S. Ct. 2022 (1987); Shaare Tefila Congregation
v. Cobb, 107 S. Ct. 2019 (1987).
4. 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
5. Id.
6. 108 S. Ct. 1419 (1988), appeal from 805 F.2d 1143 (4th Cir. 1986).
7. Patterson, 108 S. Ct. at 1420. See generally N.Y. Times, Apr. 26, 1988, at Al, col. 6.
8. See, e.g., Runyon, 427 U.S. at 192; Bhandari v. First Nat'l Bank of Commerce, 829 F.2d
1343, 1349 (5th Cir. 1987).
9. 107 S. Ct. at 2022.
10. 107 S. Ct. at 2019. In Shaare Tefila Congregation the Court transposed the reasoning of
Saint Francis College to § 1981 based on its prior conclusion that §§ 1981 and 1982 derive from
the same source. In doing so, the Court impliedly reaffirmed Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392
U.S. 409 (1968), in which the Court recognized a cause of action for blacks against private discrimi-
nation in the purchase or sale of property.
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minorities for the purposes of sections 1981 and 1982."
The American media overwhelmingly endorsed the Supreme
Court's decision, 12 believing it to be a significant expansion of civil
rights13-a reflection of the modern belief that all ethnic minorities
equally deserve freedom from discrimination. The New York Times de-
clared that the decisions created an opportunity for many Americans 4
to fight ethnic discrimination. 5 If the decisions, however, are as signifi-
cant an expansion of civil rights as the press perceived them to be, the
Supreme Court should have based its analysis on the United States
Constitution.
Part II of this Note traces the Supreme Court's purported sources
of authority and finds that they either are inappropriate or taken out of
context. Part III posits that any constitutional support must emanate
from the thirteenth amendment, the source of the authority to reach
private discrimination under sections 1981 and 1982. After tracing the
evolution of sections 1981 and 1982 since the enactment of the thir-
teenth amendment and confronting the ambiguities of the legislative
history, Part IV contends that the Supreme Court circumvented the po-
tential consequences of enlarging the scope of the thirteenth amend-
ment to reach private ethnic discrimination. Part V considers why the
Court retreated from a constitutional analysis of the scope of the thir-
teenth amendment in 1987, when it appears ready to engage in this con-
stitutional analysis in 1988. Part VI concludes that the Court may
restrict the scope of sections 1981 and 1982 to reach only discrimination
by the state consistent with a logical interpretation of the legislative
11. See Saint Francis College, 107 S. Ct. at 2026 n.4. Webster's New Twentieth Century
Dictionary of the English Language defines race as:
[A]ny of the major biological divisions of mankind, distinguished by color and texture of hair,
color of skin and eyes, stature, bodily proportions, etc.; many ethnologists now consider that
there are only three primary divisions, the Caucasian (loosely, white race), Negroid (loosely,
black race), and Mongoloid (loosely, yellow race), each with various subdivisions ...
J. McKECHNIE, WEBSTER's NEW TWENTIETH CENTURY DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1484
(2d ed. 1964).
12. See, e.g., Wash. Post, May 19, 1987, at 1, col. 1; N.Y. Times, May 19, 1987, at Al, col. 3.
13. See, e.g., M. Schwartz & E. Kaufman, Public Interest Litigation: 2 "Race" Cases De-
cided by U.S. Supreme Court, N.Y.L.J., July 21, 1987, at 1, col. 1. One commentator stated:
While the two decisions certainly carry tremendous symbolic weight, extending as they do the
protection of nineteenth century civil rights laws to twentieth-century forms of discrimina-
tion, they offer much more than psychological comfort to victims of intentional discrimina-
tion. In several important respects the 1866 provisions provide coverage and remedies not
found under modern civil rights provisions.
Id. at 5, col. 3; see also id. (providing a point by point comparison of the protections of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 with the protections of §§ 1981 and 1982).
14. N.Y. Times, May 30, 1987, at A30, col. 1 (editorial page). The newspaper noted that




history of the thirteenth amendment.
II. THE 1987 CASES
A. The Supreme Court's Analysis
1. Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji
In Saint Francis College a United States citizen born in Iraq
brought suit against a private college that had denied him tenure.16 Su-
ing on the basis of 42 U.S.C. section 1981,'1 Al-Khazraji alleged that the
college intentionally had discriminated against him because of his Ara-
bian "race." The district court held that claims of discrimination based
on ethnicity were not permissible under section 1981 and, therefore,
granted summary judgment for the college."8 The Third Circuit re-
versed and remanded, holding that section 1981 encompasses claims of
racial discrimination made by ethnic groups. 9
The Supreme Court began its analysis in Saint Francis College by
referring to Runyon. This unobtrusive citation to Runyon was the sole
reference to the controversial line of cases through which the Court had
resurrected and reinterpreted section 1981 to forbid all intentional ra-
cial discrimination in the making of public and private contracts.20
Because of the "common popular understanding" 1 that Arabs as
well as the students and faculty of the defendant college are members
of the Caucasian race, the Supreme Court had to confront whether "ra-
cial" discrimination could encompass claims brought by one Caucasian
against another Caucasian. The Court answered affirmatively by defin-
ing "race" to include ethnic groups 2 -a definition contrary to the mod-
ern concept of race.23 The Court thus circumvented a substantive re-
evaluation of its prior interpretation of section 1981.
Attempting to justify its definition, the Supreme Court emphasized
the transitory nature of the concept of race.24 In a footnote, the Court
noted that some modern scientists have attacked the twentieth century
limitation of race to Caucasian, Mongoloid, and Negroid delineations. 5
16. 107 S. Ct. at 2024.
17. See supra note 2.
18. AI-Khazraji v. Saint Francis College, 523 F. Supp. 386 (W.D. Pa. 1986).
19. Al-Khazraji v. Saint Francis College, 784 F.2d 505, 517 (3rd Cir. 1986) (defining race as
"genetically part of an ethnically and physiognomically distinctive sub-grouping of homo
sapiens").
20. See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
21. Saint Francis College, 107 S. Ct. at 2026 n.4.
22. Id.
23. See supra note 11.




These scientists argue that racial classification should be predominantly
sociopolitical in nature rather than biologically based.26 Recognizing the
possibility that the concept of race may have different meanings at dif-
ferent times,27 the Court declared its intention to use the nineteenth
century concept of race to discern the types of groups that Congress
had intended to protect under the original version of section 1981.28
The Supreme Court consulted dictionaries from the mid-nine-
teenth century.29 For example, the Court cited the 1887 edition of Web-
ster's Dictionary of the English Language,30 which defined race as:
"'The descendants of a common ancestor; a family, tribe, people or na-
tion, believed or presumed to belong to the same stock.' ",' Other mid-
nineteenth century dictionaries confirmed this definition.3 2 The Court
found the characterization of race as the stock of the individual analo-
gous to the modern concept of an ethnic group.
The Supreme Court then searched nineteenth century encyclope-
dias for specific examples of various "races.""3 Sources such as the 1858
Encyclopedia Americana referred to Finns, Hebrews, Greeks, and Rus-
sians as "races. 3 4 Relying on these examples, the Court fragmented the
unitary concept of the Caucasian race into countless ethnic subgroups.
Finally, the Court sought to imbue its analysis with an aura of leg-
islative intent. The opinion isolated one-word excerpts from the volumi-
nous legislative histories of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the Voting
Rights Act of 18705 in which congressmen had referred to ethnic
groups and nationalities as races. The Supreme Court reasoned that
statements regarding "Chinese," "Mexican," "Jewish," and
26. Id.
27. By rejecting the subjective test employed by some of the lower courts-that discrimina-
tion is racial in character if the person discriminating against another intends it to be so-the
Court refused to recognize the logical extension of the sociopolitical concept of race-that different
people may have different understandings at different times.
28. Id. at 2026-27. The Court in Runyon stated that the sources of § 1981 are § 1 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1866 and § 16 of the Voting Rights Act of 1870. Runyon, 427 U.S. at 168 n.8.
29. Saint Francis College, 107 S. Ct. at 2027.
30. N. WEBSTER, DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (W. Wheeler ed. 1887).
31. Saint Francis College, 107 S. Ct. at 2027 (quoting N. WESSTER, supra note 30).
32. Id. Other sources considered by the Court included N. WEBSTER, AN AmERICAN DICTION-
ARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 666 (N.Y. 1830), and J. DONALD, CHAMBER'S ETYMOLOGICAL DICTION-
ARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 415 (1871).
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 2028 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 3871 (1870)). For example, the
Court quoted one congressman's statement that the Congress must not permit any state to "dis-
criminate against the immigrant from China and in favor of the immigrant from Prussia, nor
against the immigrant from France and in favor of the immigrant from Ireland." Id. What the
Court failed to note is that the Voting Rights Act of 1870 is based upon the fourteenth amendment
and, therefore under a constitutionally-based analysis, cannot be the basis for reaching private acts
of discrimination, whether racial or ethnic. See infra notes 85-89 and accompanying text.
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"Mongolian" races evidenced a legislative intent to protect ethnic
groups from discrimination. 6
The Court concluded that these three sources-dictionaries, ency-
clopedias, and out-of-context quotes-constituted the relevant "legisla-
tive history of section 1981."17 Based on this conclusion, the Supreme
Court decided that Congress in 1866 had intended to protect from in-
tentional discrimination those classes of persons identifiable "solely be-
cause of their ancestry or ethnic characteristics."3 8 By implicitly
deeming the twentieth century concept of race irrelevant, the opinion
made section 1981 available for use by any identifiable ethnic group
against another ethnic group. 9
2. Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb
In Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb40 the Court transposed its
definition of race developed in the context of section 1981 to section
1982.41 In Shaare Tefila Congregation a Jewish congregation, individu-
ally and on behalf of its members, brought a section 1982 claim against
the white, non-Jewish vandals who had spraypainted the congregation's
synagogue with swastikas and anti-Semitic phrases and slogans.42 Be-
cause the Court has held that section 1982 also derives from the Civil
Rights Act of 1866,43 the Court declared that the protections of section
1982 were available under the same test as the protections of section
1981: whether, at the time Congress enacted the section, the group al-
leging discrimination was of the type that Congress had intended to
protect." Applying this redefinition, the Court permitted the claim by
the Jewish-Caucasian congregation against the Caucasian vandals. 4 5
B. The Analytical Facade
The analysis in Saint Francis College appears to be logical and is
easy to follow. The analysis, however, is superficial. The Court's use of
36. Saint Francis College, 107 S. Ct. at 2028.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 2028-29. Justice Brennan concurred to point out that the line between claims based
on ethnicity and claims based on national origin "is not a bright one." Id. at 2028 (Brennan, J.,
concurring). Brennan concluded that courts should permit plaintiffs to use § 1981 even if their
claims were based in part upon national origin discrimination. At present courts may withhold the
use of § 1981 only when plaintiffs base their claims solely upon national origin discrimination. Id.
40. 107 S. Ct. 2019 (1987).
41. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
42. Shaare Tefila Congregation, 107 S. Ct. at 2021.
43. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968) (holding that § 1982 derived from § 1
of the Civil Rights Act of 1866).
44. Shaare Tefila Congregation, 107 S. Ct. at 2022.
45. Id. at 2019.
214 [Vol. 42:209
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nineteenth century dictionaries and encyclopedias is contrived because
those definitions undoubtedly were rooted in nineteenth century big-
otry and were not a product of twentieth century scientific thought."
Moreover, the Court's decision to integrate its literal "legislative his-
tory" into a prior interpretation of sections 1981 and 1982 rather than
to re-evaluate the substantive basis of sections 1981 and 1982's author-
ity to reach ethnic discrimination raises questions regarding the Court's
motive.
Labelling the one-word excerpts from the Congressional Globe as
"legislative history" without placing the quotations in context dilutes
the Court's proposition that these groups are of the type that Congress
intended to protect. When placed in context, the quotations do not sup-
port, and in fact undermine, the Court's contention.4 7 Most of the refer-
ences cited by the Court were extracted from blatant declarations of
bigotry: "The domination of these colonists of the Spanish race. . . was
lost only when the gangrene of miscegenation had wasted their energies,
...then degeneracy, feebleness, and incompetency to rule came over
them." " These excerpts merely reflect bigotry; they do not reflect the
intention of Congress to protect ethnic groups.
C. Precedent
1. The Cited Precedent
In Saint Francis College the Supreme Court tersely cited Runyon
as if the Court had decided already, in Runyon and other precedent,
that sections 1981 and 1982 apply to all racial discrimination. Despite
the universal language employed by the Court in cases such as Runyon
and Jones, the Court before Saint Francis College never had faced a
claim of racial discrimination that fell outside of the Civil War contours
of the thirteenth amendment-the relationship between blacks and
whites.
All of the cases in which the Supreme Court has stated that the
thirteenth amendment authorizes Congress to legislate regarding all
46. See generally S. GOULD, MISMEASURE OF MAN (1981).
47. For example, the Court quoted Representative Kasson making reference to the Latin
race. Saint Francis, 107 S. Ct. at 2027. Representative Kasson actually referred to the Latin race
as follows:
[L]ook at those countries where mixed bloods have controlled the Government by universal
suffrage. Look at Mexico and the South American republics where revolutions are as frequent
almost as the revolutions of the seasons. Look at the Latin races of the world, and where have
they ever succeeded in establishing a permanent and reliable republican Government con-
trolled by the will of the people?
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 238 (1866) (remarks of Rep. Kasson).
48. CONGc. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 251 (1866) (remarks of Sen. Davis).
1989]
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races have implicated tensions between blacks and whites. Jones and
Runyon, for example, involved claims by blacks against whites. In Mc-
Donald v. Sante Fe Trail Transportation Co."" the Court permitted a
white man to bring a section 1981 claim against his white employer,
charging that the employer had discriminated against him in favor of a
black man-a claim also within the context of black versus white
tensions.
2. The Precedent Not Cited
Saint Francis College and Shaare Tefila Congregation involved
tensions between whites. In light of the Civil War context in which sec-
tions 1981 and 1982 arose, the Court's presumption that the authority
for this claim exists is unwarranted. Prior case law does not necessarily
provide authority for the presumption.
McDonald enunciates the Court's broadest interpretation of the
reach of the civil rights statutes. The McDonald Court considered the
applicability of section 1981 to racial discrimination in private employ-
ment against whites as a result of favoritism toward blacks. 50 The Court
extended section 1981 to protect white claimants based on statutory re-
interpretation, declaring that the phrase "'as is enjoyed by white citi-
zens'" within the text of section 1981 emphasized the racial character
of the protected rights.5 1 The Court relegated to a footnote, however,
the authority of the thirteenth amendment to permit claims by
whites.52
In that footnote the McDonald Court cited two law review arti-
cles 53 and then declared that the Court previously had "ratified" Con-
gress' authority to legislate regarding all racial discrimination under the
thirteenth amendment.5 4 To support the purported "ratification," the
Court cited Hodges v. United States and Jones.55 Hodges does support
49. 427 U.S. 273 (1976).
50. Id. at 287.
51. Id. (quoting Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780, 791 (1966)).
52. Id. at 288 n.18.
53. Id. The first law review cited in the footnote was Buchanan, The Quest for Freedom: A
Legal History of the Thirteenth Amendment, 12 Hous. L. REV. 1 (1974) (a series of articles, one at
the beginning of every book in the volume). Buchanan argued that the Court should recognize a
badge of slavery to be any act motivated by arbitrary class prejudice. Id. at 1072. He based his
theory upon the fact that arbitrary class prejudice was exactly the sort of treatment blacks had
been forced to endure. Id. at 1073. Buchanan additionally argued that these badges could be worn
on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or alienage, id., a theory that the Supreme
Court dnd other courts certainly have not adopted to date. The Court's footnote also cited Bickel,
The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1955).
54. McDonald, 427 U.S. at 288 n.18.




the Court's claim that the thirteenth amendment reaches all races, but
only in a far more restrictive context. The Hodges Court stated that the
thirteenth amendment protects all races from being entirely subject to
the will of another. 6
The Hodges Court relied on the Slaughter-House Cases in which
an earlier Supreme Court had declared that Congress has the authority
under the thirteenth amendment to stamp out any new form of slavery,
involving any race of persons, that might arise, listing as examples Mex-
ican peonage and the Chinese coolie labor system.57 The Hodges Court's
conception of the breadth of legislative power under the thirteenth
amendment is far more restrictive than that of the McDonald Court.
The Hodges Court limited the thirteenth amendment's scope to formal
institutions similar to the American institution of slavery. This view
that the thirteenth amendment protects all races in the institutional
context of slavery does not compel the conclusion that the amendment
authorizes Congress to legislate to prohibit all racial or ethnic discrimi-
nation. Moreover, Jones overruled Hodges.5 8
The McDonald Court additionally relied on a footnote in Jones to
support the "ratification" theory.5 9 The Jones Court in turn had relied
on the Civil Rights Cases of 1883. In that footnote the Jones Court
paraphrased the proposition conceded by the Civil Rights Cases Court
that Congress could secure "to all citizens, of every race and color" cer-
tain property rights, to find that the enforcement clause of the thir-
teenth amendment authorizes legislation prohibiting private racial
barriers to property rights. 0 The Civil Rights Cases, however, held that
private refusals to accommodate blacks at inns, on public conveyances,
or in public places of amusement do not create badges of servitude and
consequently are not prohibited by the thirteenth amendment. 1
Tracing the precedent allegedly supporting the Court's broad pro-
nouncements in McDonald reveals the lack of substantive decisionmak-
ing on which Shaare Tefila Congregation and Saint Francis College are
based. The Court in Saint Francis College and Shaare Tefila Congre-
gation should have addressed squarely whether the thirteenth amend-
ment can reach private acts of discrimination based on ethnicity.
56. Hodges, 203 U.S. at 17.
57. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). The Court stated that "[i]f
Mexican peonage or the Chinese coolie labor system shall develop slavery of the Mexican or Chi-
nese race within our territory, th[e thirteenth] amendment may safely be trusted to make it void."
Id. at 72.
58. Jones, 392 U.S. at 441 n.78.
59. McDonald, 427 U.S. at 288 n.18 (citing Jones, 392 U.S. at 441 n.78).
60. Jones, 392 U.S. at 441 n.78 (citing The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 1 (1883)).
61. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 1.
1989]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
III. CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY SUPPORT FOR SECTIONS 1981 AND
1982
A. The Thirteenth Amendment
Because the Supreme Court in Saint Francis College purported to
rely on legislative intent, and because the line of cases under which the
Court extended the protections of sections 1981 and 1982 rests upon
the Court's interpretation of the legislative history of the thirteenth
amendment and the Civil Rights Act of 1866, investigation of the
Court's lack of analysis must begin with the substance of the legislative
history-the debates surrounding the adoption of the thirteenth
amendment and the passage of the 1866 Act. The congressional debates
reveal a complexity of motive and intent not apparent in the majority's
analysis.
Many congressmen voted for the thirteenth amendment for reasons
far removed from any concern for the welfare of blacks. The preserva-
tion of the Union was a primary reason for supporting the amend-
ment.62  The war was over; the institution of slavery had been
defeated, 63 and the thirteenth amendment was nothing more than a for-
mal interment of the institution. Northerners and Southerners ab-
horred the institution, not for its effect on blacks, but rather for the
destruction slavery had inflicted upon whites, including a devastating
war, the death of loved ones, and the loss of free speech. 4
Other congressmen sought to ensure civil rights for all men who
had been subject to the bonds of slavery. The legislative debates indi-
cate that these congressmen intended to protect former slaves, North-
ern freedmen, 5 Northern whites who had been treated unfairly in the
South while campaigning against the institution of slavery, 6 persons
who in the future might be subject to servitude analogous to slavery,67
and loyal Southern whites who had been mistreated within the South. 8
Some congressmen, including Senator Trumbull, the leading
spokesman for the thirteenth amendment,69 sought to ensure that all
62. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 258 (1865) (remarks of Sen. Rollins of
Missouri).
63. See tenBroek, Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States: Con-
summation to Abolition and Key to the Fourteenth Amendment, 39 CALiF. L. REV. 171, 177 (1951).
64. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 237 (1865) (remarks of Sen. Smith of
Kentucky).
65. See Buchanan, supra note 53, at 11; tenBroek, supra note 63, at 179.
66. tenBroek, supra note 63, at 177.
67. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 72.
68. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 438 (1866). Southerners were "reduced from men
almost to chattels because of their fidelity to our flag, to our Constitution, and to this country." Id.
(remarks of Sen. Howe).
69. See tenBroek, supra note 63, at 190.
[Vol. 42:209
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men in the United States would be entitled to equal civil rights. React-
ing against the institution of slavery, these men responded by universal-
izing their beliefs.70
Each of the motivations holds different ramifications for the histor-
ical interpretation of the scope of the thirteenth amendment. The first
view, that the amendment abolished the institution of slavery and its
immediate incidents, suggests that Congress could legislate under the
thirteenth amendment only to protect blacks and other persons imme-
diately affected by public or private acts of enslavement. The second
view, only slightly broader than the first view, would permit Congress to
protect any person, regardless of color, from the closely related inci-
dents of the formal institution of slavery, either public or private.71 The
third, expansive view of the thirteenth amendment apparently would
enable Congress to make the amendment's protections available to any
man, of any color, who had been denied statutorily granted civil rights.
The modern Court has employed this third motivation as the thirteenth
amendment's authorization to reach private discrimination. Having
taken this step, the Court could have interpreted the references to "all
men" as the basis for reaching ethnic discrimination. Even under this
broad view, however, the legislative history is ambiguous regarding
whether the protections of the thirteenth amendment extend both to
private and to state violations. 2
B. The Civil Rights Act of 1866
In 1866 Congress passed the Civil Rights Act 3 pursuant to the ena-
bling clause of the thirteenth amendment. The Act gave a range of enu-
merated rights to citizens of every race and color and then distributed
enforcement powers to the branches of the federal government.74 Sec-
tion one of the 1866 Act7 5 creates the right to make and enforce con-
70. See CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 154 (1865) (remarks of Sen. Davis of New York)
(stating that "[n]ature made all men free, and entitled them to equal rights before the law").
71. This view was the one adopted by the Supreme Court in the cases it considered in the
years immediately subsequent to the adoption of the thirteenth amendment. See Hodges v. United
States, 203 U.S. 1 (1906), overruled by Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 443 n.78 (1968);
The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 1, 3 (1883); Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 72.
72. How to interpret this ambiguity has been a question that has divided the Supreme Court
in its modern opinions.
73. Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (the Civil Rights Act).
74. Id.
75. Id. § 1, 14 Stat. at 27. Section 1 of the Act reads:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America
in Congress assembled, That all persons born in the United States and not subject to any
foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed, are hereby declared to be citizens of the United
States; and such citizens, of every race and color, without regard to any previous condition of
slavery or involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall
1989]
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tracts, as well as the right "to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and
convey real and personal property.""6 Section two of the Act"7 mandates
criminal penalties for infringements on the rights granted under section
one by any persons acting "under color of any law, statute, ordinance,
regulation, or custom." All citizens were to enjoy these enumerated
rights to the same extent permitted to white citizens.7
Congress passed the 1866 Act in order to implement the protec-
tions of the thirteenth amendment.79 The immediate need for legisla-
tion apparently arose in response to specific deprivations of the civil
rights of the freed black men and the failure of the Freedman's Bureau
to provide comprehensive relief.80 Congress, however, expressly cast the
statute in universal terms-including language such as "all persons
born in the United States" and "of every race and color"-to encom-
pass all citizens, not simply blacks. Consequently, the debate that had
surrounded the adoption of the thirteenth amendment resurfaced and
intensified, focusing on the ability of the thirteenth amendment to sup-
port such expansive legislation.
have been duly convicted, shall have the same right, in every State and Territory in the
United States, to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit,
purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property, and to full and equal bene-
fit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and property, as is enjoyed by white
citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, and penalties, and to none other, any
law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, to the contrary notwithstanding.
Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. § 2, 14 Stat. at 27. Section 2 of the Act reads:
And be it further enacted, That any person who, under color of any law, statute, ordinance,
regulation, or custom, shall subject, or cause to be subjected, any inhabitant of any State or
Territory to the deprivation of any right secured or protected by this act, or to different
punishment, pains, or penalties on account of such person having at any time been held in a
condition of slavery or involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the
party shall have been duly convicted, or by reason of his color or race, than is prescribed for
the punishment of white persons, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on convic-
tion, shall be punished by fine not exceeding one thousand dollars, or imprisonment not ex-
ceeding one year, or both, in the discretion of the court.
Id.
78. Id. § 1, 14 Stat. at 27.
79. General Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 387 (1982) (quoting the
leading spokesman for the bill, Sen. Trumbull. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474 (1866)).
Senator Trumbull summarized the paramount aims of his bill in his statement that:
Since the abolition of slavery, the Legislatures which have assembled in the insurrectionary
States have passed laws relating to the freedmen, and in nearly all the States they have dis-
criminated against them. They deny them certain rights, subject them to severe penalties, and
still impose upon them the very restrictions which were imposed upon them in consequence of
the existence of slavery, and before it was abolished. The purpose of the bill under considera-
tion is to destroy all these discriminations, and to carry into effect the [thirteenth]
amendment.
80. See tenBroek, supra note 63, at 184-85.
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C. The Adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment
The explicit language of the 1866 Act did not end the debate.
Many congressmen continued to protest that the protections of the
1866 Act exceeded the scope of protection under the thirteenth amend-
ment. They argued that only a constitutional amendment could author-
ize the broad protections set forth in the 1866 Act. 1 The fourteenth
amendment was enacted in part because of the persistence of this
debate.2
The themes of the debate remained unchanged while the doubts
regarding the ability of the thirteenth amendment to support such leg-
islation grew. The congressmen who had voted for the thirteenth
amendment in order to end the devastations of the Civil War again ar-
gued that the thirteenth amendment merely had authorized Congress to
abolish the formal institution of slavery. 3 Under this pressure, even
those congressmen who, in principle, might have supported the grant of
civil rights under the 1866 Act began to doubt the constitutional au-
thority of the thirteenth amendment to provide for the Act's broad
protections.
Other congressmen, despite their undisturbed belief that the thir-
teenth amendment was sufficiently universal in scope to authorize such
legislation, recognized the vulnerability of the legislation to a more lit-
eral construction. These congressmen sought the adoption of the four-
teenth amendment in order to incorporate the protections of the 1866
Act into the Constitution."' Because these congressmen perceived the
thirteenth amendment to be capable of supporting such legislation,
they believed that the fourteenth amendment's focus on state violations
would not limit the scope of the 1866 Act to protections against public
discrimination.
Because the fourteenth amendment expressly limits its protections
to violations by the State, the legislative history surrounding the adop-
tion of the fourteenth amendment is relevant to acts of private discrim-
ination only to the extent that it sheds light on the sufficiency of the
thirteenth amendment to support legislation such as the Civil Rights
Act of 1866. Thus, in order to prohibit private ethnic discrimination
using legislative intent, the Court must find support in the terms of the
1866 Act, interpreted with regard to the scope of its sole authority-the
thirteenth amendment.
81. See Bickel, supra note 53, at 11-29.
82. See id.
83. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 113, 318, 476, 499, 507, 576, 600-01 (1866).
84. See Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 32-33 (1948) quoted in General Bldg. Contractors, 458
U.S. at 384-85.
1989]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:209
D. The Voting Rights Act of 1870
After the adoption of the fourteenth amendment, Congress passed
the Voting Rights Act of 1870.85 The 1870 Act primarily established
voting rights for all citizens, but it also appended three sections unre-
lated to voting rights. Section sixteen,86 in part, provided all persons in
the United States with the right to make and enforce contracts. Section
seventeen 7 declared that violations of section sixteen made under the
color of law were criminal. Finally, section eighteen 8 re-enacted the
Civil Rights Act of 1866, apparently in response to the debate over the
constitutionality of its provisions, and, thus, made sections sixteen and
seventeen of the 1870 Act enforceable according to the provisions of the
1866 Act.
According to its legislative history, Congress intended that sections
sixteen and seventeen of the 1870 Act provide the same protections for
aliens, with the exception of property rights, as Congress had provided
for citizens in 1866.89 As a product of the fourteenth amendment, the
85. Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140 (the Voting Rights Act).
86. Id. § 16, 16 Stat. at 144. Section 16 of the 1870 Act reads:
And be it further enacted, That all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall
have the same right in every State and Territory in the United States to make and enforce
contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and
proceedings for the security of person and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall
be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind,
and none other, any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom to the contrary notwith-
standing. No tax or charge shall be imposed or enforced by any State upon any person immi-
grating thereto from a foreign country which is not equally imposed and enforced upon every
person immigrating to such State from any other foreign country; and any law of any State in
conflict with this provision is hereby declared null and void.
Id.
87. Id. § 17, 16 Stat. at 144. Section 17 of the 1870 Act reads:
And be it further enacted, That any person who, under color of any law, statute, ordinance,
regulation, or custom, shall subject, or cause to be subjected, any inhabitant of any State or
Territory to the deprivation of any right secured or protected by the last preceding section of
this act, or to different punishment, pains, or penalties on account of such person being an
alien, or by reason of his color or race, than is prescribed for the punishment of citizens, shall
be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on conviction, shall be punished by fine not exceed-
ing one thousand dollars, or imprisonment not exceeding one year, or both, in the discretion
of the court.
Id.
88. Id. § 18, 16 Stat. at 144. Section 18 of the 1870 Act reads:
And be it further enacted, That the act to protect all persons in the United States in their
civil rights, and furnish the means of their vindication, passed April nine, eighteen hundred
and sixty-six, is hereby re-enacted; and sections sixteen and seventeen hereof shall be en-
forced according to the provisions of said act.
Id.
89. See Bbandari v. First Nat'l Bank of Commerce, 808 F.2d 1082, 1091 (5th Cir.) (Bhandari
I) (quoting Sen. Stewart of Nevada, the bill's sponsor from CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 1536
(1870)), rev'd, 829 F.2d 1343 (5th Cir. 1987) (en banc) (Bhandari II). The panel in Bhandari I
developed its analysis as if it were going to reverse the prior Fifth Circuit precedent, but, in the
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protections of the 1870 Act expressly reached only state infringements.
The purpose of the re-enactment of the 1866 Act in section eigh-
teen is distinct from the purpose behind the protections accorded aliens
under sections sixteen and seventeen. The re-enactment appears to be a
response to the debates over the constitutionality of the 1866 Act. The
legislative history is ambiguous, however, regarding whether Congress
intended through re-enactment to base the authority for the 1866 Act
solely on the fourteenth amendment, or whether Congress intended for
the re-enactment merely to be a reaffirmation, thereby leaving it based
on the authority of the thirteenth amendment. Basing the 1866 Act
solely upon the fourteenth amendment would necessarily limit its pro-
tections to incidences of discrimination by the State.
E. Consolidation and Codification
The final point of confusion regarding the statutory histories of
sections 1981 and 1982 is their allegedly routine codification in 1874.
Faced with an abundance of redundant and disorganized legislation, a
late-nineteenth century Congress decided to clean house. Congress au-
thorized three appointed commissioners to consolidate, revise, arrange,
and simplify all of the statutes, in whole or in part.90 As a result of this
process, the 1866 Act and sections sixteen, seventeen, and eighteen of
the 1870 Act somehow became 42 U.S.C. sections 198191 and 1982.92 Be-
cause nothing in the 1870 Act authorized the rights of property, section
1982 necessarily derives from section one of the 1866 Act. Whether de-
liberately or in error,93 the commissioners labelled section 1981 "Equal
Rights Under the Law," and appended an historical note which stated
that the section derived entirely from section sixteen of the 1870 Act.
This apparent consolidation of the contractual rights provisions of sec-
tion one of the 1866 Act with the contractual rights provisions of sec-
tion sixteen of the 1870 Act would have been a logical decision on the
part of the commissioners only if they had interpreted both sections as
end, the court reluctantly believed itself to be constrained by stare decisis. Bhandari I, 808 F.2d at
1105. The opinion in Bhandari II relied heavily on the panel's analysis in reversing the circuit's
precedent. Bhandari II, 829 F.2d at 1345. Consequently, the analysis in the initial opinion is valid
and influential. Senator Stewart stated: "the original civil rights bill protected all persons born in
the United States in the equal protection of the laws. This bill extends it to aliens. . . . It extends
the operation of the civil rights bill. . . to all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States."
Id.
90. Act of June 27, 1866, ch. 140, 14 Stat. 74, amended by Act of May 4, 1870, ch. 72, 16 Stat.
96.
91. Section 1981 apparently was a consolidation of § 16 of the 1870 Act and § 1 of the 1866
Act.
92. Section 1982 was based § 1 of the 1866 Act.
93. The modern Supreme Court made this observation in Runyon, 427 U.S. at 168 n.8.
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reaching only state action. In other words, the relevant portion of sec-
tion one would be subsumed into section sixteen, "all persons" from
section sixteen being a larger category than "all citizens" from section
one.
If section 1981 is based solely on section sixteen of the 1870 Act, as
ihe contemporary commissioners asserted, and because section sixteen
is based solely upon the fourteenth amendment, then section 1981 pro-
vides no authority to reach private acts of discrimination. Conse-
quently, in order to employ section 1981 to provide protection against
private discrimination, the Supreme Court simply stated that the com-
missioners erred and that they must have mistakenly assumed that the
relevant language in section one of the 1866 Act was redundant in light
of the closely parallel language contained in section sixteen of the 1870
Act.9 4
IV. THE SUPREME COURT'S EvALuATION OF THE PRECEDING
LEGISLATIVE AND STATUTORY HISTORY
A. The Majority
Beginning with Jones in 1968, the Supreme Court has interpreted
the thirteenth amendment and its legislative history as authorizing
Congress to prohibit private racial discrimination. The Court also has
stated that Congress affirmatively legislated to prohibit private racial
discrimination in the 1866 Act. 5 Other than in dicta, however, the
Court has never interpreted the thirteenth amendment, or its legislative
history, as granting authority to reach private ethnic discrimination.
Neither did the 1987 cases do so; instead, they were based upon histori-
cal extrapolation. Evaluating both the majority and dissenting interpre-
tations of the legislative history of sections 1981 and 1982, however,
highlights the issues that ought to have been before the Court in 1987.
These issues are the ones that will face the Court in 1988.
The Supreme Court's analysis in Jones, which revived section 1982
after long years of disuse, forms the analytical core of the Court's sub-
sequent opinions concerning the scope of sections 1981 and 1982. In
Jones the Court advanced three arguments. First, because the right to
purchase, hold, sell, inherit, or lease property can be impaired as easily
by private action as it can be by state action, the majority reasoned that
the purpose behind the plain and unambiguous language of the statute
would not be effectuated if it did not reach private action.96 Second, the
majority declared that section two of the 1866 Act, which provides
94. Id.
95. Jones, 392 U.S. at 409; see Runyon, 427 U.S. at 160.
96. Jones, 392 U.S. at 420-22.
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criminal sanctions for violations of section one committed under the
color of law, would have become superfluous if the Court had inter-
preted the entire statute to prohibit only state discrimination. 7 Finally,
and in the greatest detail, the Court argued that the legislative history
of the 1866 Act proved that Congress was concerned with racial dis-
crimination by private parties when it passed the 1866 Act. 8 The ma-
jority cited numerous references to instances of private acts of
discrimination brought to the attention of the 1866 Congress. 9 For all
three of these reasons, the Court determined that Congress must have
intended for the statute to reach private acts of discrimination.
Finally, the majority evaluated the language of the thirteenth
amendment in order to create a construct under which Congress would
have had the constitutional authority to prohibit private racial discrim-
ination.100 Because the language of the thirteenth amendment so closely
reflects its Civil War heritage and, therefore, is potentially restrictive in
meaning and scope, the majority equated "badges and incidents of slav-
ery" with modern "burdens and disabilities."'' e The Runyon majority
used the construct created in Jones in order to extend the protections
of section 1981 to reach private racial discrimination.1 2
B. The Dissents
Justice Harlan's dissent in Jones, and Justices White and Rehn-
quist's dissent in Runyon,0 s argued that Congress had not intended for
either section 1981 or section 1982 to reach private racial discrimina-
tion.104 These opinions rebutted the majority's conclusions using the
same analytical framework that the majority had used, considering first
the literal meaning of the language, then the implications of the struc-
ture of the 1866 Act, and finally the legislative history of the thirteenth
amendment.
Justices Harlan and White began their analyses by arguing that the
97. Id. at 424-26. The Court argued that Congress would not have legislated a provision that
was ineffective when it is read in conjunction with the rest of the statute. Id. at 425-26.
98. Id. at 427-37.
99. See id. at 427-28.
100. Id. at 437-43.
101. Id. at 441.
102. Runyon, 427 U.S. at 179.
103. The majority opinion in the 1987 Fifth Circuit case of Bhandari v. First National Bank
of Commerce, 808 F.2d 1082 (5th Cir. 1987) (Bhandari 1), revived the dissenting arguments in
Jones and Runyon.
104. Justice White in his dissenting opinion in Runyon, 427 U.S. at 192, argued that § 1981
was distinguishable from § 1982 in that it was derived from § 16 of the 1870 Act. He did not
reargue that the thirteenth amendment did not authorize Congress to legislate to reach private
acts of discrimination because he believed that he was constrained by the Jones precedent. See id.
at 193-95 (White, J., dissenting).
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majority was misguided in basing their decision on ambiguous language.
Justice Harlan declared that the "right" recognized in the 1866 Act
need not allude to an absolute right, enforceable against all men, but
rather may refer to a right of equal status under the law.105 Justice
White contended that the phrase "as is enjoyed by white citizens" not
only makes the protections of the statute racial in character, as the ma-
jority had asserted, but also presupposes an external measure of the
rights of white citizens.1 06 This external measure requires an evaluation
of the rights that a white man holds outside the context of the statute
in order to determine the rights that all others hold within the terms of
the statute.107 Justice White recognized that no law requires white men
to enter into contracts against their will. Thus, because the external
standard against which the rights of all others are measured is private
in nature, Justice White concluded that Congress could have intended
that the language of the 1866 Act solely protect against state
violations.108
Justice Harlan's dissent in Jones also challenged the majority's
conclusion that section two of the 1866 Act, which imposed criminal
sanctions for state violations of section one, would become redundant if
the Supreme Court were to interpret section one as reaching only state
action. Instead, Justice Harlan reasoned that section two was simply an
enforcement clause, drafted to provide incentives to comply with the
provisions of section one.109 Interpreted in this way, section two is not
redundant, thus refuting the majority's reliance on the structure of the
1866 Act as evidence of the scope of the Act.
105. Jones, 392 U.S. at 453 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
106. Runyon, 427 U.S. at 193-95 (White, J., dissenting).
107. Id. This same argument was made by the Fifth Circuit in Bhandari L See Bhandari I,
808 F.2d at 1092-93.
108. Runyon, 427 U.S. at 194 (White, J., dissenting). The majority in Bhandari I also ad-
vanced this argument. See Bhandari I, 808 F.2d at 1092.
109. Jones, 392 U.S. at 454 (Harlan, J., dissenting). This argument also was made by the
Bhandari I majority. See Bhandari I, 808 F.2d at 1093. The Fifth Circuit in Bhandari I addition-
ally argued that even if § 2, in requiring state action, was narrower in scope than § 1, this conclu-
sion did not mandate the further conclusion that § 1 reaches all private conduct. Id. at 1094.
Instead, the court proposed that Congress may have intended § 1 to reach private violations of
state law. See id. The court cited in support § 2 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, now 42 U.S.C. §
1985(3) (1982). See 808 F.2d at 1094. In Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971) (quoted in
Bhandari I, 808 F.2d at 1094), the Supreme Court held that Congress intended in § 2 to "provide[]
a remedy for deprivations by private conspiracies of equal protection of the laws." Bhandari I, 808
F.2d at 1094 (summarizing holding of Breckenridge, 403 U.S. at 97). Additionally, the Fifth Circuit
quoted the Chairman of the Judiciary Committee who declared in referring to the 1866 Act that
the supporters of the bill did not wish to make a general criminal code for the states, which is what
would happen if the Act made private violations of state law a criminal offense. Id. (quoting CONG.




Finally, the dissenters addressed the majority's contention that the
legislative history of the 1866 Act clearly evidenced Congress' intent to
prohibit private discrimination. Just as the majority in Jones had cited
quotations from the legislative history of the Act to prove that Congress
had intended to reach private discrimination, so did Justice Harlan cite
numerous quotations to prove that Congress had intended to limit the
Act's protections to state action.110 In addition, Justice Harlan ex-
amined the contexts from which the majority's quotations had come
and discovered that the quotes were not only ambiguous in meaning,
but also equally consistent with his premise that section one reaches
only state action."'
To avoid conflict with the Jones precedent, Justice White attacked
the majority's interpretation from another angle. He declared that sec-
tion 1981 was based solely upon section sixteen of the 1870 Act. Under
this interpretation, section 1981 necessarily is based upon the four-
teenth amendment and thereby reaches only state action.1 ' Citing the
reviser's unambiguous note that the basis of section 1981 was section
sixteen of the 1870 Act, as well as a confirmatory sidenote labelling the
statute "Equal Rights Under the Law," Justice White refused to accept
the majority's contention that section 1981 was based upon both section
sixteen of the 1870 Act and section one of the 1866 Act. 3
In addition, Justice White argued that the majority's finding that
the basis of section 1981 was both section sixteen of the 1870 Act and
section one of the 1866 Act forced a dichotomy upon the statute clearly
not within its terms and not intended by Congress." 4 By its terms, sec-
tion 1981 applies to all persons; the 1866 Act protects only citizens.
Consequently, noncitizens could not enjoy the protections of the 1866
Act, but rather would be forced to rely on the 1870 Act which only
protects against state action. Basing section 1981 on both section six-
teen and section one forces the judicial enforcers of the statute to draw
a distinction that the plain language of the statute does not draw.11
Lower courts have wrestled with this dichotomy, but the Supreme
Court has not resolved the issue."' Justice White's argument, however,
is persuasive; both commentators and courts have commented on the
weakness of the majority's analysis in grounding section 1981 on both
110. Specifically, Justice Harlan quoted Senator Trumbull, the bill's leading spokesman. For
the full quotes, see Jones, 392 U.S. at 459-62 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
111. Id. at 461-62.
112. Runyon, 427 U.S. at 202 (White, J., dissenting).
113. See id. at 205-06.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 206.
116. See, e.g., Bhandari I, 808 F.2d at 1098.
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the 1866 and 1870 Acts. 117
V. POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES OF ADDRESSING SQUARELY WHETHER TO
EXPAND THE SCOPE OF THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT
The authorization for the extension of sections 1981 and 1982 to
reach ethnic discrimination was one of a number of potential extensions
confronting the lower federal courts.""8 By redefining race, rather than
attempting to find legislative support for the Court's analysis in Saint
Francis College and Shaare Tefila Congregation, the Supreme Court
effectively divorced the issue of ethnic discrimination from other poten-
tial extensions of sections 1981 and 1982. The Court's decision in the
1987 cases appears to be a compromise; the decision appeased those
justices who did not want to extend the protections of sections 1981 and
1982 further by limiting the interpretive scope of the decisions, but yet
pleased those justices who sought to make the provisions of sections
1981 and 1982 equally available to all victims of discrimination by ex-
tending the protections of the provisions to include ethnic groups. Con-
cealing the constitutional issues beneath the mound of dictionaries and
encyclopedias enabled the Court to avoid sending the signal that it was
willing to extend the scope of the thirteenth amendment in the form of
sections 1981 and 1982.
The continuing lower court debate over whether section 1981 en-
compasses claims by resident aliens of private discrimination" 9 exem-
plifies the unresolved issues. 2 ' In 1974, prior to Justice White's dissent
in Runyon, the Fifth Circuit held that because section one and section
sixteen were coextensive, such claims were cognizable. 2' In 1987, how-
ever, the Fifth Circuit en banc reversed itself. 2 2 Relying on the panel's
careful and exhaustive examination of the statutory and legislative his-
tory of section 1981, the en banc court declared that because the Su-
preme Court had erred in creating a cause of action for private
discrimination under Jones and Runyon, it was not obligated to extend
117. The Fifth Circuit en banc in Bhandari II confidently declared that the reasoning of
Jones and Runyon cannot stand of its own force. Bhandari v. First Nat'l Bank of Commerce, 829
F.2d 1343, 1349 (5th Cir. 1987) (en banc).
118. See infra notes 120-30. Other potential extensions of §§ 1981 and 1982 are prohibitions
against discrimination on the basis of sex or religion. See Buchanan, supra note 53, at 1073.
119. The Supreme Court deliberately left the question open in Espinoza v. Farah Manufac-
turing Co., 414 U.S. 86, 96 n.9 (1973).
120. See, e.g., Espinoza v. Hillwood Square Mut. Assoc., 522 F. Supp. 559, 564 (E.D. Va.
1981) (holding that § 16 is coextensive with § 1 because the 1870 Act extended the operation of the
1860 Act); De Malherbe v. International Union of Elevator Constr., 438 F. Supp. 1121, 1140 (N.D.
Cal. 1977) (holding that the legislative history of § 16 is undisputable, that it applies only to state
action; the "merger" of the provision into § 1981 cannot change this result).
121. Guerra v. Manchester Terminal Corp., 498 F.2d 641 (5th Cir. 1974).
122. Bhandari, 829 F.2d at 1343.
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this flawed reasoning to a new domain.12 1 In reaching this conclusion,
the Fifth Circuit was forced to analyze the scope of the thirteenth
amendment, an analysis that the Supreme Court should have made in
Saint Francis College and Shaare Tefila Congregation.124
In fact, the Court in Saint Francis College stated, in dicta, that
persons with claims of discrimination based on national origin were not
within the type of groups that Congress had intended to protect." 5 The
Supreme Court apparently drew this distinction between alienage and
ethnicity because Congress had passed the 1870 Act specifically in re-
sponse to discrimination against resident aliens, under the auspices of
the fourteenth amendment. Undisputed legislative history forced the
Court to maintain this distinction, thus making the availability of sec-
tions 1981 and 1982 turn upon the plaintiff's label for his claim. The
distinction has become a matter of semantics; for example, a plaintiff
can claim that he was discriminated against because he is Arabic rather
than because he is from Iran. Focusing on the reason for the difference
in semantics highlights the difficulties that the Court would have faced
in dealing with the issues comprehensively.
The case presently before the Supreme Court, Patterson v. Mc-
Lean Credit Union,12 illustrates another unresolved issue-whether a
charge of racial harrassment, as opposed to racial discrimination, cre-
ates a cognizable claim under section 1981. In Patterson the plaintiff
charged racial harassment per se and sought to bring her claim under
section 1981.127 The district court, in refusing to submit the claim to the
jury,128 stated that her claim was not cognizable under section 1981.
The Fourth Circuit affirmed. 29 The Fourth Circuit reasoned that the
contract language of section 1981 cannot support the claim because har-
rassment, as opposed to discrimination, does not affect the existence of
the employment contract directly, but instead merely implicates the
terms and conditions of the contract.130 Although the extension of sec-
tion 1981 raised in Patterson is distinct from the extension of sections
1981 and 1982 accomplished in Saint Francis College and Shaare
123. Id. at 1351-52.
124. Interestingly, while the original panel in Bhandari I mentioned that Saint Francis Col-
lege and Shaare Tefila Congregation were pending before the Court, Bhandari I, 808 F.2d at 1087
n.6, the en banc decision, published four months after the 1987 cases, made absolutely no mention
of the cases. Bhandari II, 829 F.2d at 1343. Because the lack of substantive analysis in Saint
Francis College made the cases extremely restrictive, this later omission in Bhandari II is not
surprising.
125. See Saint Francis College, 107 S. Ct. at 2026-28.
126. 805 F.2d 1143 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 65 (1987).






Tefila Congregation, substantive evaluation of the constitutional basis
for the 1987 cases necessarily would have revived the issue now before
the Court in its request to consider overruling Runyon-whether the
authority of section 1981 to reach private discrimination is constitution-
ally based.
Additionally, claims of private discrimination on the basis of reli-
gion and sex have been attempted, and for the most part, have failed in
the lower courts.' Guidance from the Court concerning its willingness
to legitimize further extensions of sections 1981 and 1982 would answer
some of the questions that these lower court cases have raised.
VI. CONCLUSION
While purporting to rely on legislative history, the Supreme Court
defined race according to nineteenth-century bigotry. If the Supreme
Court in fact had employed legislative history in Saint Francis College
and Shaare Tefila Congregation, it would have had to confront the
same constitutional issues that it has summoned in Patterson.
The nature of the Court's request to the parties in Patterson sug-
gests that the Court may re-examine the constitutional basis of section
1981 by relying on legislative intent. In order to remain consistent with
the legislative history, the Court is faced with three choices. First, the
Court could reject its prior analysis of the derivation of section 1981,
and adopt Justice White's determination that this section derives solely
from section sixteen of the 1870 Act. Second, based on the strains
within the legislative history that restrict the scope of the thirteenth
amendment to its Civil War contours, the Court could determine that
neither section 1981 nor section 1982 reaches private acts of discrimina-
tion. Finally, by adopting the strain of the legislative history that uni-
versalizes the thirteenth amendment, the Court could reaffirm that
both section 1981 and section 1982 reach private discrimination. Be-
cause of the complexity of motive and intent that lay behind the adop-
tion of the thirteenth amendment and the passage of the 1866 Act, the
Court's choice of any one of the three interpretations would be reasona-
bly consistent with the legislative history. Yet, the Court must be will-
ing to face the consequences of its choice.
Although a decision to accept the revisers' notation that section
1981 derives solely from section sixteen of the 1870 Act would eliminate
the dichotomy between its application to citizens and its application to
noncitizens, the decision would create other problems. The choice
would create an external dichotomy between the protections afforded




the right to contract and the protections afforded the rights of property.
Section 1981 only would protect against discrimination by the state,
while section 1982 would continue to reach private discrimination. The
illogic of this dichotomy would re-emphasize the question whether the
revisers in fact had considered section sixteen of the 1870 Act to be co-
extensive with section one of the 1866 Act merely because they did not
perceive the 1866 Act as capable of reaching private discrimination.
A decision to adopt the interpretation of the legislative history con-
sistent with the language of the thirteenth amendment and its Civil
War contours would require the Supreme Court to reject outright the
analysis of Runyon and Jones. This decision would create a consistent,
but restrictive, thirteenth amendment analysis. Under this analysis,
neither section 1981 nor section 1982 could be used against private
discrimination.
A decision to reaffirm the authority of sections 1981 and 1982 to
reach private discrimination by relying expressly on the strain in the
legislative history universal in conception would carry with it broad im-
plications. Language such as "[n]ature made all men free' 13 2 could en-
compass the prohibition of private ethnic discrimination. The breadth
of this strain of legislative history, however, does not end with the pro-
hibition of private ethnic discrimination. Adopting natural rights as the
underlying premise for sections 1981 and 1982 would open the possibil-
ity of further extensions, both of the types of groups that Congress in-
tended to protect and of the types of discrimination against which
Congress intended to protect.
Although Saint Francis College and Shaare Tefila Congregation
further extended the protections of sections 1981 and 1982, the manner
in which the Supreme Court did so evidences an intent to contain fu-
ture extensions. It is unlikely, therefore, that the Court in 1988 will
choose to adopt the natural rights strain of the legislative history. In
addition, adoption of the view that section 1981 derives solely from sec-
tion sixteen of the 1870 Act is both shortsighted and illogical because of
the external dichotomy that it creates. The remaining choice, to recog-
nize the Civil War contours of the thirteenth amendment and, there-
fore, restrict the broad application of sections 1981 and 1982 to
discrimination by the state, would permit the Court to create a logical,
consistent analysis, grounded in a reasonable interpretation of the legis-
lative history.
Jennifer Grace Redmond
132. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 154 (1865) (remarks of Sen. Davis of New York).
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